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In 1979 the Research Group of the Central Bureau of Statistics
estimated a model for world trade in manufactured goods, with particular
emphasis given to the Norwegian export of such goods. The data used covered
the years 1960 - 1977. In this period substantial tariff adjustments took
place in all major industrial countries, and considerable efforts were there-
fore made to give a satisfactory treatment to tariffs in the theoretical as
well as the empirical part of the work. A documentation has been presented
in RAPPORTER from the Central Bureau of Statistics 79/29 "Modell for norsk
eksport av bearbeidde industrivarer".
In response to an inquiry from the Secretariat of EFTA, the present
report is a translation of those parts of the original report, which dealt
with the analysis of tariffs. Several changes were made in order to allow
this report to be read independently of the Norwegian documentation. More-
over, new calculations on tariff indices were made to illustrate the signi-
ficance  of the Kennedy Round and of the creation of EFTA and EEC.
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INTRODUCTION
During the last twenty years considerable changes have taken
place in tariff rates in most industrial countries. Tariff rates on
manufactured goods within both EFTA and the EEC were eliminated in the
course of the 1960's and the EEC countries established a common external
tariff. The Kennedy Round resulted in significant reductions in the tariff
rates applied by the United States, Canada and Japan. In the beginning of
the 1970's the EEC was enlarged to include three former EFTA members, and
the other EFTA countries including Norway - concluded agreements con-
cerning reciprocal tariff reductions with the enlarged EEC.
The tariff adjustments led to considerable changes in the compe-
titive position of industries in the various countries. The competitive
position of import-competing industries in the industrial countries de-
teriorated because tariff rates were generally reduced. But the tariff
adjustments also resulted in changes in the competitive position of export-
competing industries because changes in tariff rates differed among coun-
tries.
In this paper we will attempt to quantify those changes in the
competitive position of different countries' manufacturing industries which
can be traced to tariff rate adjustments we derive an index for the ave-
rage tariff rate on imports on a given market and an index of the relative
tariff between the tariff rates that a given country encounters and the
rates its competitors encounter on their mutual export markets. Both these
indices are based on the theoretical model which is developed in the early
part of this note. For these magnitudes - and for each of 15 countries -
annual values have been computed for the period 1960 - 1977 for manuf ac-
turedoods. l) At the end of the section we use specially comp valuesg	 P	 Y	 P
of some of these indices in a discussion of the consequences of establishing
EEC and related tariff developments.
Information of tariff rates according to an extremely detailed commo-
dity classification is available for most countries. Based on such infor-
mation it is possible to compute the indices which are derived in this paper.
This would, however, be an extremely time-consuming task. Instead, we have
started with a set of "most favoured nation" tariff incidences computed by
GATT for relatively aggregated commodity groups. With the aid of information
1) Manufactured goods are defined as commodities contained in SITC (Rev 1)
5-8, ex 68 and 735. See United Nations (1961) .
concerning the tariff adjustments that have taken place under the
auspices of the EEC, EFTA and GATT and certain other information, we
have computed time series for the magnitudes mentionded above.
2. A general equilibrium model for world trade 
The theoretical framework for our analysis is a general equili-
brium model for world trade, in which the export and import of the aggre-
gate commodity is determined simultaneously.
There are L countries in the model, each of which produces the
aggregate commodity "manufactured products" and sells it on the world market
in competition with each other. Each country k produces the exported
commodity x 
E
k using variable inputs and a given capital stock Kk . The in-
dustry may be characterized by free competition, and we assume that margi-
nal cost pricing or some other price setting rule gives us the following,
usually increasing, supply function:
"E=	
Xk (v




represent variable unit cost and p
k . 
is the export price index, both
measured in country k's own currency. Let us introduce a numeraire
currency, and let Øk
 be the exchange rate, i.e the price of the numeraire
currency measured in country k's currency. Variable unit cost and the ex-
>A.
.ar
port price index of co runtry k measured in the numeraire currency are given
by:
The model is akin to the world trade models developed by the OECD





vk = vk / dk 	and 	Pk = Pk ^ ak •
Substituting these expressions into the supply function ,gives
=	 E(Ø 	 ^e E• )
xk. kv k kPk ' Kk ' k=1,..., L. (2.1)
If the supply function were homogeneous of degree zero in v k and pk ,
then the exchange rate would vanish as an argument in (2.1) .
We will follow Armington's (1969) two level approach in deter-
mining the demand for imports, and assume that each country's export of
manufactured goods represents a product which is different from the other
countries export of manufactured goods. These "products" then compete
on each import market Q on the basis of their relative prices. Let p B
kQ
and xkk be the price and the quantity of manufactured goods delivered
from country k to country Q, and let B
k be country Q's total import. The
demand for product k on market k can be written:
B B	 B 	 B
=xkQ 	 - 	 ØQ (PlQ' . . . , pkQ , . . . pLQ)  B ^k
k,k=1, . . . , L; k0k (2.2)
where 
B
 represent the import share functions, i.e  the demand for importØQ P 	 P 	 'P
product k to mark Q per	 2) 	 B	 et pe unit of total import. 	 The prices . pkt
2) The set of import share functions2k=1,...,L;, 	 k#k . is assumed toØk
have been derived from a cost function or a utility function on the
basis of cost minimization or utility maximization. This optimization
is carried out on the basis of prices measured in country k's own
currency. But the exchange rate vanish as an argument in (2.2) ..since
these functions are homogeneous of degree zero in prices. We have
therefore choosen to express (2.2) directly in terms of the numeraire
currency.
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are measured in a numeraire currency. We have assumed a priori that
the import elasticity of xk, with respect to Bt is unity. Country Q's
own production of manufactured goods is excluded from the system (2.2) .
At the "upper" level total import BQ in country 2 is determined
i of 	
A 	
r 	 in countryas a funct on
	
	 the price pQ of manufactured goods p oduced n c  
Q, . the price index of imports p B [see (2.5) below] , and country Q's gross
Q
nationalroduct R 3) •
	
P 	 Q •
A




The set of equations (2.1)-(2.3) describe the L(L+l) behavioral equa -
tions of the rcodel. 4) The model is 	 bycompleted  three sets of definitions.P 
The import prices are defined by:
PB 	= t h PE ^k^, 	 k!^ kQ k k, k=1, . . . , L; kOk 	 (2.4)
where tk2 is one plus the percentage tariff imposed on import from country
k to country k (se section 3) , and 
hk2 
represents the difference between
3) This two level approach ., with the demand for domestically produce goods
determined at the upper level as a function of the price ratio p st/pt and
GNP, is rendered necessary by the lack of data on manufactured goods de-Y Y 	 g
livered to the domestic market. It would be theoretically more satis-
factory to include the relationship between import and domestically pro-
duced manufactured goods at the lower level, i.e in (2.1), and to repre-
sent the relationship between manufactured goods and other goods at
the upper level.










c.i.f. and f.o.b. prices. The import price is thus measured inclusive
of tariffs, while the export price is f.o.b. We assume that there has
been no systematic shift in the relationship between c.i.f.  and f.o.b.
prices, and we thus ignore possible changes in 
Q
 [see Samuelsen (1973) ,
15, for a test of this hypothesis].
The import price index p B
Q 
in country Q is defined as the minimum
cost per unit of B t :
B= 	 pB (pB , . .., 
B
 . .. 
B )
Pt 	 Q 1Q 	 pkQ> 	 >PLQ ^ 2.=1,. . . , L 	 (2.5)
and depends on the degree of substitutability which exists between the
import from different countries . 	 The identities which specify that the
supply of exports from each country must equal the demand for that country's
exports, the latter being the sum of the demand on each market, gives:
= 	 E
k#kom k=1, ..., L 	 (2.6 )
Summarizing the model, we see . that equations (2.1) to (2.6) gives
us a system of 2L( L+1) equations in 2L(L+1) endogenous variables:
Number of variables
P-
price of exports (in numeraire currency)
ls
import prices (in numeraire currency)






xk2 - export volume from country k to country 2. 	 L (L-1)
- import, total 	L
The system of import share functions 
B
mkt ;  k=1,...,L, k0Q, are the partial
derivatives of the import price index with respect to the prices of imports,
kQ 	 pQ/ pkQ
B 
Q
The exogeneous variables are:
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Number of variables
vk variable unit cost
Ap^ - price of deliveres to domestic market
(in numeraire currency)
- capital stock (or production capacity)
- gross national product (or aggregate demand) 	 L
tk9 
- 	 tariffs L(L-1)
Øk - exchange rate; price of numeraire curren-
cy measured in country k's currency
In this model the tariff rates are among the exogeneous variables
which determine the magnitude of export volumes and export prices and other
endogenous variables. In order to be able to analyze further how changes
in tariffs affect the endogenous variables of the model (and to get a
model which can be estimated) , we will choose explicit functional forms
for the equations (2.1)-(2.J). 6)
 
We will further make some simplifications,
- some of which. may seem rather drastic -- which. will result in a model
which contains a set of rather familiarqrice a uations 7) and a set of in-p
dices which_ measure the influence of tariff changes.
The choice of an explicit functional form will be determined by
taking the logarithmic Taylor expansion of the equations, evaluated at
the base year of the model. Let
f ,. • • p
To get a model that could be estimated was of course the main purpose
of choosing explicit functional forms in Frenger, Jansen and Reymert
(1979).




be an arbitrary function. Take the logarithm of both sides, and compute
the first two terms of the Taylor expansion with respect to lnx., i=1,...,n
about x = (x1 ,...xn This g ives:
n ^lny 
ln Y = E 	 1
- 	 . 	 a1nx.y► 	 1=1. 	 1 -
x
(2.7)
 in (2.7) can be interpreted as elasticities.  8 )The coefficients  	




and P Bt , k, Q=1, . . . ,L
by setting (2.2) , (2.4) and (2.5) into (2.1) , (2.3) and (2.6) . We then
differentiate the latter system of equations with respect to the remaining




) and the exogenous variables. The
supply equations (2.1) become
lnxk = nk lnpk + r^ lnvk + (r^ + t^) 1nØk
+ K^k ^ln 	 + const.. 	 k= 1 , . .. , L (2.8)
The coefficients nE , r and nK represent 	 the supply elasticities withk k 	 k
respect to the export price, variable unit cost , and capital stock res-
pectively.
9)
The demand equations (2.6) for country k's exports present some-
what greater problems. By assuming that the elasticity of substitution
between any two countries' exports to market Q is the same and denoting
this parameter by G it can be shown thatthat the logarithmic a roxiP	 y k ' 	 g 	 PP
mation to the demand equations are: .
8) We have in general not normalized the variables in relation to their base
year values which. therefore become part of the constant term.
9) TIL 	 rl 	q	 homogeneous 	 degreethat L = - v if the supplyequation is   of   zero
in the export riceP 	 and variable unit. costs.
10) See appendix C in Frenger, Jansen and Reymert (1979) .
14
lnxk = E[ E wkQ Q QE[ 	 ) ] lnp^ +
j 2k
+ E E wkQ G t ( s
j kj
Q-^ ) 1nt . Q
j kik  J
+ E
Q0k





are the base year export and import shares, and. is the Kronecker delta
J
(equal 1 if j=k and equal zero otherwise). Both the competitors price
index and the tariff index, which will be derived below, will take the
approximation (2.9) as their point of departure.
The second level demand functions are represented by (2.3). Their
logaritmic Taylor expansions are: .
1nB 	 = 	
R 
1nR + 	 B ln ( `4/ B) + cons t.,
Q	 ^1Q	 Q 	 ^Q 	 PQ PQ
(2.10)
where f is the volume (or income) elasticity of imports, and 
nB 
is the
Q 	 ) 	 Y 	 P	 Q
elasticity with res p ect to the price ratio A/ $ . The import price indexY 	 r 	 P 	 PQ PQ 	 P 	 p
 is given by the approximation:PQ 	 g 	 Y
1npB 	=	 E s. 1npE + 	 E s. lnt. 	 + const. 	 (2.11)
Q j23 Q 	 JJ	
.QJ
Let us designate the second sum in (2.11) by 1nT Q . The tariff parameter
TQ is thus a geometric average of the tariffs faced by the exporters to
market Q and may be interpreted as the : average tariff on market k11) .Y 	 P 	 g
Combining (2.10) and (2.11) gives the second level demand function:
11) These indices will be analyzed in much greater detail in section 3.
dk;
= 	 E w 	 (s. -6 )
kk 	 j5t kjtOk
lnXk 	 =	 -
	 E E w 	 (s. -6 ) lnt.
dkk j StOk kR, 	 j2, kj
	 32,
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lnBt 	=	 n 1nR 	 + n
B
[lnp




t 	 St 	 j 	 j
The equations (2.8), (2.9) and (2.12) form a complete simultane-
EvKR
ous model which is linear in the unknown elasticities nk , nk, nk, nk
Band n, k,St=1,...,L. The model is also linear in the unknown parameters
ak , k=1,...,L, but they enter the equations in a more complicated pattern
imposing restrictions both within and across the individual equations.
Another, and perhaps the greatest, simplification we will perform
is to assume that the elasticity of substitution for manufactured products
a is the same on all markets, i.e. at = a, 2=1,...,L. Let us define thek
following coefficients and variables:
Fork 	
kj
0j,d..is an average of the import shares of country k's exports,
weighted by market St's share of countryk's ekport.
12)
 Note. also that Ed,. = 0,
Kj
and that the diagonal elements dkk are negative. The index X k is a double
weighted geometric average of the tariffs faced by country k and its com-
petitors. They form a set of L exogenous variables, which in the model
replaces the detailed tariffs tkt . Rewriting the demand equation (2.9)
using (3.1) and (3.2) gives:
E





 lnp. 	 lnX]
j K 
dIN.M.11 
+ E wk, 1nBt + const.
St
(2.15)   
12) The computed values of the weights d are to be found in Appendix B.
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In order to get the model which was estimated in Frenger, Jansen
and Reymert (1979) some further simplifications are necessary. But these
simplifications do not affect the treatment of tariffs. We will, however,
present them in this note so that the reader can see how the tariff rate
indices were incorporated in the estimated warid price model, and the model
for Norwegian exports.
Let us substitute(2.15) for x 
E
 in the supply equations (2.8) and
solve for the k'th export price. This gives a set of L equations which
we will call the price model:
- ^ 	 ) 1npE = - ^k k 	 ^k -1-^ E d lnp E- 	 + lnXd
 jik








+ const. 	 k=1 , , ..,L. 	 (2.16)
^'	 k
This price model consists of a set of simultaneous equations in the endo-
genous variables 	E , k=1,...,L, and each equation is a reduced form of
k
country k's supply and demand equations for export.
Equation(2.16).shows that export prices depend both on the produc-
tion capacity and on the level of imports in each country. Lack of data
on the capital stock for many countries forces us to assume that that K. k
and B have grown so smoothly that we can ignore their net effect, i.e that
the real magnitudes have played no . significant role in the price formation.
This could have happened if the producers had correctly forecasted the
growth of their market, and increased their production capacity according-
ly. This assumption, which may be reasonable in the long run, has obvious
shortcomings over . the business cycle, but it does lead to a familiar set of
relations which simultaneously explain the development of export prices
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on the basis of variable costs alone. We will in the following also
ignore the possible effects . of changing exchange rates on the supply
functions.
Let us define the index of competitors' prices inclusive of the
tariff index:




This is a doubly weighted index of the export prices of country k's
competitors, and of the tariff rates, the latter correcting for changes
in competitive position which arise from unequal development in the tariffs.
It should be stressed that this index of competitors' price depends
crucially on the assumptions of the model, particularly the assumption
of equal elasticity of substitution on all markets, and on the approxi-
mation method used.
Taking into consideration our assumptions about the capital stock,
imports, and the exchange rate, allows us to write the . simplified price
model:
C ^tE - Qd 	 ln E = - 	 ^l CT - v	 + 	 _k 	 ^) 	 pk 	 np 	 ^ lnv 	 const. k-1,..., L. (2.18).^k k 	 k k
This simplified price model forms a complete simultaneous equation model in .
the L endogenous variables lnpE , and explains their development on the
k
basis of changes in variable costs and the tariff rates. The model was esti-
mated in section 4 of Frenger, Jansen and Reymert (1979) .
The primary purpose of that paper was to develop a model for Nor-
wegian export. The price model (2.18) was used to obtain an estimate of the
price index CT of Norway's 	 '	 pN o orway s competitors. If we set this expression into
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2.15) with k = N we obtain the demand equation for Norwegian exports:
l En 	 _ 	 ^	 .xN 	- d^ (1n CTpN - 1npEN) + E wNQ lat1^ + cons t . _(2.19)
The supply equation (still ignoring the exchange rate) for Nor-
wegian exports is given by (2.8) with k=N:
1n^cN = pk ln pk + nk 	 lnvk + nk 1nKk + const. 	 (2.20)
We proceeded to reestimate (2.19) and (2.20) simultaneously both because
not all the structural parameters are identified by the reduced form
price model (2.18) and because o-f the need to include the real variables
KN and Bt , 2=1,...,L in a model which explains the volume of Norwegian
exports
3. The use of tariffs in the world trade model
The tariff rates enter the export model in two places:
- They are used to compute the import prices (see e.g. (2.11)).
- They are included in the price index of competing exports
(see (2.17)).
The import prices in the model are weighted averages of the export
prices plus tariffs.
1) Equation (2-11) gives:
	lnpB 	=	 E s. ln E + E s , lnt. + const. 	 (3.1)
J
	
Q 	 .#Q 	 jJ2,J
pj ^
The model is expressed in percentage changes from a base point value
and we have assumed that the rate of transportation charges etc.
remains unchanged. We may therefore ignore the difference between





= 	 E S.  lnt.^




= 	 T - 1 (3.3)
TQ is country Q's average tariff rate on imports of manufactured goods.
The price index of competing exports for a country is defined by
equation (2.14) and (2.17) :
ln CT 	 = 	 - 1 	E d . lnp. 	 lnXpk 	 d
j#k k 	 pj k
(3.4)
lnXk == 	 E w ( -d 






d 	 E 	 E wkk s. k ln t
j ^ 
kk 2,0k jik 	 J 	 kk
(3.5)
We see that the L(L-1) tariff rates tij enters the model only as
the 2L indicesT7 (or T2, Q=1,...L and X k
 , k=1,...L. In this section we
will analyze the contents of these indices and we will present the computed
values which were used in estimating the model in Frenger, Jansen and
Reymert (1979). It will be shown that these indices are of interest also
outside the world trade model and that the computed values of these
indices give interesting information about the changes in competive posi-




Mscountry  average tariff rate on imports
of manufactured goods. Each country's tariff incidence, defined in this
way, is shown in table 3.1. for the period 1963 to 1977. If table A.5.
(in appendix A) is compared with table 3.1., we find that for Canada, the
United States and Japan the tariff incidence for 1973 is equal to the
"most favoured nation" tariff incidence prevailing on 1 January 1973.
This is so since these three countries neither reduced tariff rates during
1973 nor discriminated between different countries. On the other hand, the
computed average tariff incidence for all other countries for 1973 is lower
than the "most favoured nation" tariff incidence on 1 January 1973. This
is due to the fact that all the other countries were members of a customs
union or a free trade area in 1973 and thus had a lower tariff rate than
the "most favoured nation" rate (or possibly no tariffs at all) on imports
from the other countries within the same customs union or free trade area.
From table 3.1. it will also be seen that according to our methods
of calculation the European industrial countries had virtually no tariff
protection in the last year covered by our calculations. The United
Kingdom had the highest tariff incidence (3 per cent), while the computed
tariff incidence for all the other countries was lower than l2 per cent.
Canada, the United States and Japan, on the other hand, had at that time a
relatively high tariff protection for manufactured goods (7.3, 8.1 and
9.7 per cent, respectively).
Given the way in which the rules for tariff reductions within the
EEC, EFTA and GATT were formulated, those countries which initially had
the greatest tariff protection would implement the largest tariff reduction
measured in percentage points. This applied. to Italy and France in the
EEC and to Austria and the United Kingdom in EFTA. Austria reduced its
average tariff rate on manufactured goods by about 17 percentage points in
the period 1960 - 1977, while the reduction for the other three countries
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was about 12 percentage points. The tariff reduction in the same period
for those countries outside EFTA and the EEC - Canada, the United States
and Japan - was 4 to 6 percentage points. Those countries which initially
had the lowest tariff rates also had relatively low reductions in tariffs -
the Benelux countries and West Germany in the EEC and the Nordic countries
and Switzerland in EFTA. In these countries the average tariff rates were
also reduced by 4 to 6 percentage points in the course of the 18 year
period we have examined.
Table 3.1. Average tariff rate on imports of manufactured goods 1) . 1960-1977. In.per cent.



















1960 11.4 12.7 15.9 7.7 7.2 6.1 12.6 12.8 14.8 4.1 6.6 5.4 6.9 18.0 4.5
1961 11.4 12.7 15.9 7.0 6.6 6.0 10.8 11.9 14.3 3.7 6.2 5.0 6.4 17.3 4.4
1962 11.4 12.7 15.9 6.1 5.8 5.3 9.2 10.2 13.7 3.4 5.7 4.6 5.7 16.5 4.2
1963 11.4 12.7 15.9 5.5 5.3 5.1 8.1 8.9 13.3 3.1 5.4 4e3 5.2 16.1 4.1
1964 11.4 12.7 15.9 5.3 5.1 5.2 7.5 8.3 13.0 2.9 5.1 4.0 4.8 15.6 4.0
1965 11.4 12.7 15.9 4.7 4.6 4.7 6.4 7.1 12.6 2.6 4.8 3.7 4.4 15.1 4.0
1966 11.4 12.7 15.7 4.1 4.0 4.3 5.3 6.1 12.2 2.4 4.5 3.4 3.9 14.6 3.9
1967 11.4 12.7 15.9 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.9 5.6 11.4 1.9 3.9 2.9 3.5 13.6 3.7
1968 10.6 11.8 14.7 3.3 3.4 4.1 3.5 4.0 10.5 1.8 3.6 2.7 2.9 12.6 3.4
1969 9.8 10.9 13.4 2.6 2.7 3.5 2.5 2.9 9.6 1.6 3.3 2.5 2.7 11.5 3.1
1970 8.9 9.9 12.2 2.4 2.5 3.2 2.3 2.7 8.8 1.5 3.0 2.3 2.5 10.5 2.8
1971 8.1 9.0 10.9 2.2 2.2 2.9 2.1 2.4 7.9 1.3 2.6 2.1 2.3 9.4 2.6
1972 7.3 8.1 9.7 2.0 2.0 2.6 1.9 2.2 7.0 1.2 2.4 1.9 2.0 8.3 2.2
1973 7.3 8.1 9.7 1.8 1.9 2.4 1.7 2.0 6.5 1.0 2.1 1.7 1.9 7.1 2.0
1974 7.3 8.1 9.7 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.5 1.8 5.3 0.8 1.6 1.4 1.4 5.1 1.5
1975 7.3 8.1 9.7 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.6 4.4 0.6 1.3 1.1 1.1 3.6 1.1
1976 7.3 8.1 9.7 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.3 3.5 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.7 1.9 0.8
1977 7.3 8.1 9.7 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.2 3.1 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.5 1.1 0.6
1) Average tariff rate TE is computed by ln Tt = 	 E sin I nt^ L where Tt = Tt - 1.J1
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The interpretation of the competitions' relative tariff indices
k
1S SUlllewna.L more difficult than that of the In (2.14) Xk is defined
as a geometric double-weighted average of the different t i .'s. In the A-
J
index for Norway, for example, the tariff on Swedish export to Denmark will
be given a weight proportional to the product of Denmark's share of Norwegian
exports and Sweden's 2 ) 	 .	 share of Danish imports. 	 The index is normalized
by the "diagonal" term -d .
kk
An examination of the homegenity properties of
k
 will help in the
interpretation of these indices. As mentioned in the previous section A k are
homogenous of degree zero in all the tariffs. (t .. , i # j) . This is a simple
iJ
consequence of the fact that the weights w (s. - 6 j k ) sum to zero overkQ J Q 
the indices j and Z. This is readily seen by rewriting the sum of the weights
as E w 	 E
J 
(s . - S . ) , and noting that the sum E (s . n - 	 . ) is byk kk . #z JQ 	 kJ 	 JS^ 	 kJ
J
definition equal to zero. Equation (2.14) can be rewritten :
_ _ 	̂ tj^k 	
d	 E wkQ . E s ' Q ln (
Q
t )kk ^,^k	 J^Q J 	k^,
(3.6)
	The "diagonal" elements d
kk
	E wk (s -1) are the only negative
	k 	 Q# k Q k^
magnitudes in the sum E w (s. -6. ). This means that the sum of the
2,1,(,kQ 	 JR,Jk
one in the tariff rates t.
JQ
, where j,Q = 1,...L, kOj and j0k. The indices
Double-weighted indices are discussed in Adams et.al (1969) and Robinson
et.al (1979).
t. $,




is also homogenous of degree zero in t . , , where j = 1,...L, j0Q, because
the sum E (s. ^- Ski) equals zero.
J#, 	 J
The homogenety properties of Ak means that if all the t i.
J 
are for
example increased by 10 per cent - all countries rise their tariffs against
all other countries'by 10 per cent - the value of Xk 
would remain unchanged.
But if all other countries than country k were to face such an increase on
all export markets, and the tariffs facing country k remained unchanged, the
index k
 would increase by 10 per cent. The magnitude of X k will not be
effected if one country raises its tariffs against all countries by the same
percent. 	 If country k is met by the same tariff as its competitors on
a 	 of a will be equal to one. 3) A value ofall her export markets, the v lue 	k	 q
ilk greater than one means that country k's competitors on the average face
higher tariff rates than country k on its export market. The magnitude of
Xk is hence an expression of the tariff discrimination other countries face
compared with country k on k's export markets.
The computed values of Ak for each country are presented in
table 3.2. It will be seen that Canada, the United States and Japan have
all encountered generally higher tariff rates than their competitors, or
equivalently,their competitors have been favoured by generally lower
tariff rates:
k 
is less than one for these three countries during the
entire period (1960-1977). This is obviously due to the fact that these
countries have been discriminated against on the European market because
they have been outside both EFTA and the EEC. This has been of relatively
less importance to Canada where k 
during the entire period has.deviated
by less than one per cent from one. This may be ascribed to the fact that
























Table 3.2. Computed values of the relative tariff restrictions for exports of manufactured goods from each
of the 15 countries 1) . 1960-1977.

















1960 	 0.999 	 0.991 0.997 1.022 1.018 0.997 0.999 1.000 0.994 1.001 0.998 1.000 1.000
1961 	 0.998 	 0.984 0.995 1.023 1.020 0.999 1.004 1.004 0.991 1.003 0.999 1.001 1.002
1962 	 0.997 	 0.977 0.993 1.024 1.019 1.002 1.007 1.007 0.989 1.007 1.001 1.004 1.006
1963 	 0.997 	 0.972 0.991 1.024 1.020 1.004 1.010 1.009 0.987 1.009 1.002 1.005 1.007
1964 	 0.996 	 0.969 0.990 1.025 1.020 1.004 1.011 1.011 0.986 1.012 1.004 1.007 1.010
1965 	 0.996 	 0.965 0.989 1.025 1.020 1.006 1.014 1.012 0.985 1.015 1.005 1.009 1.012
1966 	 0.995 	 0.960 0.988 1.025 1.020 1.008 1.017 10.14 0.983 1.017 1.006 1.011 1.015
1967 	 0.994 	 0.957 0.986 1.026 1.020 1.006 1.017 1.015 0.985 1.025 1.011 1.017 1.022
1968 	 0.994 	 0.956 0.986 1.025 1.020 1.008 1.020 1.017 0.983 1.021 1.008 1.014 1.018
1969 	 0.995 	 0.957 0.986 1.024 1.019 1.010 1.020 1.017 0.982 1.018 1.006 1.011 1.015
1970 	 0.995 	 0.960 0.988 1.022 1.018 1.009 1.019 1.016 0.983 1.017 1.006 1.010 1.014
1971 	 0.995 	 0.964 0.989 1.020 1.016 1.008 1.017 1.014 0.985 1.015 1.005 1.009 1.012
1972 	 0.996 	 0.968 0.990 1.018 1.015 1.007 1.015 1.013 0.986 1.013 1.004 1.008 1.011
1973 	 0.995 	 0.965 0.989 1.017 1.014 1.008 1.015 1.013 0.989 1.012 1.005 1.008 1.010
1974 	 0.995 	 0.962 0.988 1.015 1.013 1.009 1.013 1.011 0.994 1.012 1.006 1.008 1.011
1975 	 0.994 	 0.960 0.987 1.014 1.013 1.009 1.013 1.011 0.998 1.011 1.007 1.008 1.011
1976 	 0.994 	 0.957 0.986 1.012 1.012 1.010 1.012 1.010 1.002 1.011 1.008 1.008 1.011
1977 	 0.994 	 0.956 0.986 1.012 1.011 1.010 1.011 1.010 1.004 1.011 1 .009 1.008 1.011
1) 	 In the table we have presented A k which is defined by (cf. 	 (3-5))
lna k 	=	 - 1-- E E wkQ (s. z - S k .) lnt. t .
kkj l^^k 	 J 	 ^ 	 ^
Ak is a geometrically weighted average of the ratio between the tariff rates manufactured goods from country
k encounter on each of the export market.
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most of Canada's exports go to the United States where the country is not
discriminated against. The European market is in relative terms of con-
siderably greater importance to both the United States and Japan than to
Canada: for the United States the value of
k 	
:is 0.956 in 1977 	 This
means that in 1977 competitors of the United States generally encountered
tariff rates which were 4i per cent lower than those encountered by the
U.S. on her export markets.
Prior to the tariff adjustments in EFTA and the EEC, according to
our information, no tariff discrimination between the countries existed
except for the customs union between Belgium-Luxembourg and the Netherlands
from 1948. If we had computed
k 
for the various countries for 1958, these
would therefore have been approximately equal to 1 (but less than 1) for All
the countries excluding Belgium-Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 4) This
gives us an opportunity to analyze which countries registered an improve-
ment in their competitive position and which countries registered a deterio-
ration in their competitive position in connection with the tariff adjustments
carried out by the EEC and EFTA. When we look at the A - values for 1967 5)
we find that the "losers" (in the sense that they encounter higher tariff
rates than other countries' exporters on their own export markets) were the
United States, in particular, and the United Kingdom, Japan, Austria and
Switzerland. The fact that the competitive position of the United States
and Japan showed a deterioration is not particularly surprising - both these 
4) This follows from the fact that no tariff discrimination between
any of the countries means that tkQ= t J. 
Q
 (for all k, j and JO. and
as a result that lnAk = 0 (Ak = 1) for all k. But since Belgium-Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands already had eliminated tariffs on each others
trade and hence on the average were facing lower tariffs than other
countries on their export markets, computed values for those two countries
would have been greater than one and therefore less than one for all other
countries.
5) 1967 is the last year before the tariff reduction within the Kennedy Round.
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countries were outside the EEC and EFTA. The reasons for the deterio-
ration in the competitive position of the United Kingdom, Austria and
Switzerland, on the other hand, are not so obvious. These three countries ,
were all members of EFTA from the start and gradually benefited from
tariff reductions carried out by other EFTA countries. The reason why
these countries none the less registered a deterioration 'in their competitive
position, as we have computed it, must be that the relatively favourable
tariff treatment given by other EFTA countries was more than offset by the
relatively less favourable treatment given by the EEC countries. In
addition to the EEC countries' reductions of internal tariffs, important
export markets like the Benelux countries and West Germany raised their
tariff barriers towards third countries in the same period. Viewed
independently, a country will "lose", in the sense we use the word
in this note, when a free trade area, of which it is not a member, is
established, but will "benefit" by participating in a free trade area that
discriminates against third countries. Switzerland, Austria and the United
Kingdom were those countries which "lost" in connection with the establish-
ment of the EEC and EFTA because they delivered a relatively higher share
of their exports than the other EFTA and EEC countries to countries outside
their own free trade area, i.e. to the EEC. The Nordic countries in EFTA,
on the other hand, registered an improvement in their competitive position
as a result of the establishment of EFTA and the EEC because they to a
greater extent than the United Kingdom and Austria delivered their exports
to other EFTA countries, among which the United Kingdom was the most
important market.
The implementation of the tariff reductions within the Kennedy
Round (1968-1972) resulted - in contrast to the establishment of the EEC
and EFTA - in an improvement in the competitive position of the United
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States, Japan and Canada. For the United States, the Kennedy Round
entailed that the tariff rates the country encountered were reduced by
about one per cent in relation to the tariff rates other countries en-
countered. These three countries were those which registered an improve-
ment in their competitive position on their export markets because they
encountered lower tariff barriers in all the other countries, while the
EFTA and EEC countries could only reduce tariff barriers towards countries
which were outside their own free trade areas since the internal tariff
was abolished in both EFTA and the EEC when the Kennedy Round's tariff
reductions were initiated on 1 January 1968.
The entry of Denmark and the United Kingdom into the EEC and
the reduction of tariffs between the EEC countries and the remaining EFTA
countries led to a new deterioration in the competitive position of the
United States. From 1972 to 1977 the tariff rates American exporters en-
countered relative to other countries increased by 1,2 per cent. The com-
petitive situation for the United Kingdom, on the other hand, improved in
the same period; the relative tariff burden encountered by British exporters
fell by slightly more than 1 per cent.
The Treaty of Rome was the first of the international agreements on
tariff reductions which are taken account of in this note. EFTA was established
when attempts to create a larger European free trade area had failed (Sodersten
1970, p. 404) . The creation of EFTA can be looked upon as an attempt of the
EFTA-countries to try to resist the reduction in competitiveness for export
industries that would be the result of the Rome Treaty. A_quantification of
the decline in competitiveness to other countries which would have resulted if
EEC had remained the only custom union or free trade area in Europe can be
given by a special calculation of the indices X.  The value of these indices
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which would have prevailed after the tariff changes in the Treaty of Rome
had been implemented and no further tariff reductions had been performed, are
found in table 3.3. The "gainers" in the sense of encountering reduced
tariffs on their export markets would of course have been the EEC-countries.
After the implementation of the tariff changes in the Treaty of Rome these
countries would on the average face 2-3 per cent lower tariffs on their
Table 3.3 Calculated values of the relative tariff restrictions, ,
on exports if only the tariff changes in the Treaty of k
Rome were implemented. 1 )
Country
k    
Canada ................. 	 0.996





France ................. 	 1.029







Switzerland ............ 	 0.962
1) For a definition of X
k see equation (3.5) and table 3.2.
markets than their competitors outside the EEC according to our methods of
calculations. Worst off would have been the United States, Austria, Switzer-
land and the United Kingdom: the tariffs their own exporters would have
encountered would have been 3-4 per cent higher than those facing their compe-
titors. For the Nordic countries the relative increase in tariffs on their
export markets would have been 2-21 per cent.
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The creation of the EEC and EFTA meantdiscrimination of countries out-
side these areas, among these of course the United States. As a consequence
the Kennedy administration introduced in 1962 a bill aimed at vast reciprocal
tariff reductions and thus took the initiative to the so called Kennedy
Round in GATT. The discrimination imposed on Canada, the United States and
Japan by the tariff changes of the EEC and EFTA was discussed above,
and an estimate of the relative tariff restriction lon the United
States can be read out of table 3.2. But at the same time as the Kennedy
administration proposed tariff reductions in GATT, strong attempts were being
made to create a European free trade area (or customs union) for all the EEC .
and EFTA countries. There can therefore be of interest to try to measure
how large the deterioration in the competiveness of the United States
exporters the creation of such a free trade area would have been. If we
assume that in such a hypothetic free trade area (which in fact almost has been
implemented in the 1970's) the EFTA countries would have adopted the EEC's
"most favoured nations" tariffs, we can calculate a value of Ak of 0.925
for the United States. Hence, after the implementation of the tariff changes
in such a hypothetic European free trade area and before the Kennedy Round,
the United States' exporters of manufactures would on the average encounter
72 per cent higher tariff rates than their competitors on her export market.
Norway has together with the other Western European countries parti-
cipated in the reciprocal tariff reductions within EFTA in the 1960's and
through the trade agreements with EEC in the 1970's. 	 It can be of some
interest to compare the actual relative tariff restrictions that have faced
Norwegian exports with those that would have prevailed if Norway had stayed










































































Norway would then have encountered "most favoured nations" tariffs on all her
export markets. The value of X k for Norway (AN) that can be calculated under
these assumptions is to be found in table 3.4. column (2) and is there com-
pared with the value of 
N 
we find in table-3.2. The loss to the Norwegian
export, industries would have been increasing throughout .the 1960's and
would have reached a high point in 1967, the last year before the implemen-
tation of the Kennedy Round tariff reductions. According to these calcula-
tions the EFTA membership had by that time resulted on the average in 6 per
cent lower tariffs on Norwegian exports compared with the alternative of
Table 3.4. Calculation of the effect for Norway's relative tariff
restriction on exports market of the EFTA membership and the
trade agreement with EEC. 1)
Year
cl> .
The value of ^k
for Norway (XN )
in table 3.2
(2)
Calculated value for Xn if Norway
had not participated in the reci--
~procal tariff reductions in the
EFTA and the EEC
(3)
C(1) - (2)]/100
1) For a definition of Xk see equation (3.5) and table 3.2.
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staying outside EFTA. 	 This advantage was gradually reduced as a conse-
•quence of implementation of the Kennedy Round tariff reductions. l) The en-
largement of the EEC and the rest-EFTA's trade agreements with the EEC would
then again have contributed to a deterioration in the competiveness of
Norwegian export industries.
We would like to emphasize that these calculations are accompanied
with considerable uncertainty. Our primary concern was to develop a model
of international trade and a set of. import and export tariff indices con-
sistent with this model. The quality of the indices will depend on the
realism of the assumptions of the model, particularly the assumption of a
common elasticity of substitution on all markets. We have also used con-
stant trade weights based on a 1970 trade matrix, but patterns of trade have
changed over the period altering the relative importance of trading partners.
The choice of logarithmic approximation makes our indices into geometric
averages, while perhaps other averages would have been superior. But we
still believe that these indices anchored in a theoretic model have showed
themselves valuable in measuring the effect of the changing tariffs.
The Kennedy Round trade reductions would under these assumptions diminish
the discrimination of Norwegian export industries because tariff encounter
Norwegian exports would have been reduced in all countries but tariff
encounter other European countries exports would have been reduced only
against countries outside their own free trade area. The tariffs within




THE CALCULATION OF TIME SERIES FOR`TARIFFS
Introduction 
The price of country Vs imports of manufactured goods exported





k,Z=1, . ..,L; tOk .
where pk is the price of exports of manufactur.edgoods from country k,
t 	 the average tariff rate on country Vs imports of . manufactured
goods from country k, and hitt is the difference between f.o.b.  and c . i . f
1)
prices on this commodity flow . The determination of the tariff index
Xk and T 2, 	section . 3) require time series for tariff rates classi-
fied by exporting and importing country for the commodity group manufac-
tured goods (SITC 5-8, excluding 68 and 735)	 Such time series have not
previously been published . for this . commodity group, and we have there-
fore made our own calculations of such tariff rates for the period
............1960-1977. 	 In this appendix we will . describe in details how these tariff
rates have been computed. In the first part we will discuss the general
changes in tariffs which have occured under the auspices of the EEC, EFTA
and GATT. Thereafter we shall provide a description of the procedures used
for computing the tariff rates we have used in the estimation of the model.
1) In the empirical work on the model it was assumed that h kQ was con-
stant in the period of estimation.
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In this note a tariff rate will refer to a fixed duty on
a specific good, precisely defined according to . a commodity nomenclature,
and a tariff incidence will be a computed average tariff rate for a
commodity group where the weights are the individual commodity's share
in the aggregated commodity.
Tariff reductions within the EEC 
The EEC countries have carried out the following reductions of
internal tariff rates on manufactured goods:
Table A.1. Tariff reductions within . the EEC 1)





the reduction as a
percentage of an in-
dex of basic tariff
rates  
1 January 1959 	 10 • 	 90
1 July 1960 ....... . ...... 	 10 	 80
1 January 1961 	 10 	 70
1 January 1962 ............ 	 10 	 60
1 July 1962 .. 	 ......... 	 10 	 50
1 July 1963 .............. 	 10 	 40
1 January 1965 	 10 	 30
1 January 1966 ...... . ..... 	 10 	 20
1 July 1967 	 5 	 15
1 July 1968 •..... ........ 	 .15 	 - 	 0
1) Source: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1967-1977)..
2) The basic tariff rates are those which prevailed on 1 January 1957.
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On 1 July 1968 all tariffs on trade in manufactured goods between
the EEC countries were therefore abolished. The reductions in tariffs
were thus carried out 1 1/2 years earlier than envisaged in the Treaty
Rome.
The establishment of a common external tariff wall by the EEC countries 
The Treaty of Rome also aimed at establishing a common external
tariff wall around the EEC countries. The common tariff was in principle
calculated as an unweighted arithmetical average of the tariff rates
applied by the four customs territories within the EEC on 1 January 1957.
(France , Italy, 14 -s t Germany and the Be-Ne-Lux countries .) Exceptions
were made for the so-called List G goods. In addition, it was decided
that the tariff rates for certain raw materials (List B) were not to ex-
ceed 3 per cent, for certain semi-manufactures (List C) 10 per cent and
for certain manufactured goods (List D) 15 per cent.
In connection with.. the progressive introduction of the common
tariff the EEC implemented the following schedule for tariff changes
(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1967-1977)):
1 January 1961 	 -	 30 per cent
1 July 1963 	 - 	 30 per cent
1 July 1967 	 - 	 40 per cent
(This rate of change 	 is computed as the reduction in percentage points
of the difference between the national tariff rate on 1 January 1957 and
the common tariff.)
The Treaty of Rome also allowed the various member countries
to apply to the EEC commission for temporary exemptions from the reduc-
tions in tariffs, i.e. to establish a temporary extra tariff. . The Nor-
wegian Market Committee's reports (Norwegian Ministry of ForeigH.Affairs
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(1967-1977)) suggest that the opportunity to levy extra tariffs was not
been used by the member countries to any significant extent.
Tariff reductions within EFTA 
The agreement concerning the establishment of EFTA (Stockholm
Convention) was signed am 4 January 1960 by Norway, Denmark, Portugal,
the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden and Austria. The main objective
of the agreement was the gradual elimination of tariffs and the abolition
of other trade barrieres on trade in manufactured goods between the
countries. The EFTA countries, on the other hand, did not aim at estab-
lishing a common external tariff as was the case with the EEC countries.
In the Stockholm Convention (Article 3, section 2) a timetable
was drawn up for the elimination of the member countries' tariffs. This
was later accelerated and the reduction in tariffs on most manufactured
goods was effected on the basis of this timetable:
Table A.2 . . 	 Tariff . reductions within .EFTA 1 )
Date
Reduction as a per-
centage of an index
of basic tariff
rates2 )
Tariff rates . after
the reduction as
percentage of an in-
dem . of basic tariff
rates2)
	
1 July 1960 ............ 	 20 	 80
	
1 July 1961 ............ 	 10 	 70
	
1 March 1962 ............ 	 10 	 60
	
31 October 1962 ......... 	 10 	 50
	
31 December 1963 ........ 	 10 	 40
	
31 December. 1964 ........ 	 10 	 30
	31 December 1965 ........ 	 10 	 20
. 	 ,
	31 December 1966 ........ 	 . ... 20  	 0
1) Source: Stortingsmelding 33 (1966-67).
2) The basic tariff rates 'are - with certain exceptions - those which










Some one year after the signing of the Stockholm Convention
the EFTA countries and Finland signed an agreement which,aimed at eli-
minating tariff restrictions between EFTA and Finland. In this agree-
ment (signed in Helsinki on 21 March 1961) a timetable was drawn up for
dismantling Finland's tariffs on imports from the EFTA countries. This
tariff reduction schedule was also later accelerated and the reductions
followed this timetable:
Table A.3. Gradual elimination of Finland's tariff rates on imports from
EFTA countriesl)
Date Reduction as a per-
percentage of an index
of basic tariff rates 41
Tariff rates after the
reduction as a percentage
of an index of basic
tariff rates2)   
	
July 1961 ...... ... . .... 	 30
	
1 August 1962 ........... 	 10
	
30 April 1963 ............ 	 10
	
1 May 1964 .......:...... 	 10
	
1 March 1965 ............ 	 10
	31 December 1965 ......... 	 10
. 	 ,
	31 December 1966 .......C.	 10
	
31 December 1967..... . W 	 10 	
1) Source : The table has been drawn up. by ` the authors on the basis of
information from the Norwegian Ministry of Commerce.
2) The basic tariff rates are those which prevailed on 1 July, 1961.
The other EFTA countries' gradual abolition of tariffs on imports
from Finland followed the general plan for eliminating tariffs within the
free trade area.
The Kennedy Round - sixth round of trade negotiations in GATT
The background for . the Kennedy. Round was the U.S Trade Expan-
sion Act, an enabling act adopted by Congress in October 1962. "The
Act empowered the President to cut U.S. tariffs by up to 50 per cent,
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subject to reciprocity. Tariff rates of 5 per cent or less could be
eliminated", (storringsproposis j on nr. 2 1 (1967-68), page 3.) Politi-
cally, the initiative for the Kennendy Round was an attempt on the part
of the United States to avoid being adversely affected by the establish-
ment of tariff exemption within EFTA and the EEC.
The final agreement was signed on 30 June 1967, the day before
the time limit set by the American enabling act expired. As amain rule  a
50 per cent reduction in tariff rates for manufactured goods was accep-
ted. But the various countries gradually presented relatively long lists
of goods which should be exempted. The average tariff reductions were there-
fore considerably lower, on the order of 35-40 per cent. In the agree-
ment two different timetables for carrying out the reduction in tariffs
were set out:
"a) A participating country which begins reducing tariffs on
1 January 1968 shall put into - effect a fifth of the full re-
duction towards the final rate on this date and four fifths
of the full reduction in four equal cuts on 1 January 1969,
1970, 1971 and 1972.
b) A participating . country which begins reducing, tariffs on 1 July
1968 or on a date between 1 January and 1 July 1968 shall put
into effect two fifths of the full reduction towards the final
rate . on this date and three fifths of the full reduction in
three equal cuts on 1 January 1970, 1971 and 1972." (0p.cit.,
p.22).
In the agreement the other countries had drawn up two alternatives
for reducing tariffs on chemical goods. The most far-reaching presupposed
an abolition of the so-called ASP system , while the least far-reaching
should enter into force if the U.S. Congress refused . to . abandon the ASP
system. The U.S. Congress later rejected a proposal to discontinue the
ASP system.
The ASP system (American Selling Prices) entails the calculation of
tariffs in relation to the price of the competing American product(s)
and not in relation to the price of the imported good.
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Enlargement of the EEC and tariff reductions between original members of the
EEC and EFTA
Based on negotiations between the EEC and EFTA the following tariff
reduction and adjustment schedules were adopted:
Table A.4. Reduction of tariffs between EFTA countries . and the EEC. Ad-
justme t to the EEC's external tariff for new EEC member coup-
tri 1)es
Date Reduction of inter-
nal tariff rates as
a percentage of an in-





1 April 1973 	 20 	 -
1 January 1974 	 20 	 40
1 January 1975 ............. 	 20 	 20
1 January 1976 ............. 	 20 	 20
1 July 1977 ................ 	 20 	 20
1) Source: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1967-1977).
2) The basic tariff rates are those which prevailed on 1 January 1972.
3) Reduction as a percentage of the original difference between the EEC's
common external tariff barrier and the new member countries' tariff
barrier prior to entry into the EEC.
The schedule for the progressive elimination of tariffs was to
be applied between all EFTA countries and the EEC, while the adjustment
schedule was only to be applied by the new member countries in the EEC - the
United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. Exceptions from the schedule for tariff
elimination were later made for Norway and Finland where the first stage in
the internal reductions in tariffs was implemented three monthes later than
for the other countries. Otherwise the schedule for tariff reductions and
adjustments was carried out.
It was also decided that the tariff reductions for so-called
"sensitive" goods should be effected over a longer period. In principle,
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the tariff on such "sensitive" goods was to be eliminated over a period
Of 7 or 11 years. At the same time, however, an import ceiling was esta-
blished in the form of an upper limit on the quantity of goods which
could benefit from the tariff reductions.
The list of "sensitive" goods varied from one country to another.
For the original EEC countries it included, among others, rayon wool, un-
wrought aluminium, iron and steel products, ferro-alloys, paper and board
and paper products. Denmark and the United Kingdom reimposed tariffs on
paper, board and paperboard products towards. former. EFTA countries on 1
January 1974, raised the tariff to 8 per cent in stages to 1.July 1977 and
shall thereafter follow the same reduction schedule as the other EEC coun-
tries. The list of sensitive goods for Norway comprised, among other things,
textiles and clothing, colour television receivers, plastic raw materials
and plastic products, rubber products, footwear, glass products, various
electrical products, etc.
Those tariff rates in Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom which
did not deviate more than 15 per cent were fixed equal to the EEC's common
tariff on 1 January 1972.
Computing the average tariff rates (t.)
J,
Most of the information on tariff rates is available according
to an extremely detailed commodity classification - based on the 4-digit
BTN classification or even more detailed. It is of course on such a level
the tariff rates are stipulated by the authorities ; : and used by those who
levy the tariff on the imported goods • Even though we could obtain such
time series for tariff rates for the various products, the task of computing
the average tariff rates we are interested in . would be far too comprehen-
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sive. We have therefore chosen the following procedure for our calcu-
lations
1) 	 We have started out with a set of "most favoured nation" tariff
incidences computed by GATT (GATT (1974)) 	 The tariff incidences are com-
puted as a weighted average of tariff rates on a more disaggregated level
where we have used the tariff incidences which are computed with the vari-
ous commodities' relative importance in imports in 1970-1971 as weights.
GATT has computed weighted.. averages for what they have called raw materials,
semi-manufactures and finished manufactures. We have used a weighted
average of the last two categories. (Cf. table A.5.) GATT's calculation
referred to the tariff rates prevailing on 1 January 1973, i. e . after the
tariff reductions from the Kennedy Round had been carried out. The compu-
tations covered all the countries in our export model excluding Denmark
_ 	 P
and the United Kingdom (probably because these two . countries at that time
had become members of the EEC . even though they had . not introduce4 the EEC's
common external tariff rates)
For the United Kingdom we have computed the tariff incidence for
manufactured goods on 1 January 1973 with the aid of information from
Preeg (Preeg (1970) , pp. 208-211) . We have assumed that the ratio computed
by Preeg between the U.K' s and the EEC's tariff incidence . for manufactures
will be the same a 's the corresponding ratio according to GATT's commodity
classification and weighting method.
Based on a corresponding principle, we have computed` the tariff in-
cidence for Denmark and . for the various EEC . countries (the GATT P
only gave one customs tariff for the EEC. countries because the common ex-
ternal tariff had by this time already been established) . Based on infor-
ublication
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Table A.5. "Most favoured nation" tariff incidence on 1 January 1973 for
manufactured goods. Percentages.1)
Canada  	 7.3
United States  	 8.1
Japan  	 9.7
Belgium/Luxembourg  	 7.4
Netherlands  	 7.4
West-Germany  	 7.4
France  	 7.4




Norway  	 2.6
Sweden  	 4.2
Denmark
2)	3.8
Finland  	 4.4
Austria 	  11.2
Switzerland  	 2.8
1) Source: GATT (1974). The figures are computed as a weighted average
of the tariff incidences for "semi-manufactures" and "finished manu-
factures".
2) Computed by the authors as described in this appendix.
• mation on average rates (Joint Economic Committee (1961)) , the "most
favoured nation" tariff rates. for 1961 have been computed by taking into
account that the tariff reductions within EFTA and the EEC were already
under way and that the approximation to the common external tariff in the
EEC had begun. For Denmark these computations gave an average "most
favoured nation" tariff equal to 0.83 of Sweden's in 1961. The computations
for the four customs territories within the EEC gave the following relative
average "most favoured nation" tariff rates for manufactured goods prior
to the adjustment to the common tariff (as a share of the EEC's later





We have assumed that all the countries have applied the so-called
"most favoured nation" tariff rates towards all countries excluding those
within the EEC and EFTA.
2) 	 In order to compute changes in the tariff incidence over time we
have taken the following . events into account:
- Tariff exemption between the Be-Ne-Lux countries since 1948.
- Reductions of internal tariff rates within the free trade area
EFTA. 	
.
- Reductions of internal tariff rates within the EEC and the
establisment of the common external tariff for the EEC-countries.
- Implementation of the Kennedy. Round within GATT.
- The entry of Denmark and the United Kingdom (and Ireland) into
the EEC and the other EFTA countries' trade agreements with the
EEC.
All the tariff reductions (under the auspices of the EEC, EFTA and
GATT) are assumed to have been implemented as late as possible within the
limits of the agreements. (This means we have assumed that a tariff reduc-
tion which, according to the agreement, should be implemented before 1 July
of a given year, was in fact implemented on 30 June.)
For the tariff reductions as a result of the Kennedy Round we
have used computations carried out by Preeg (1970) for the EEC
countries, the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States. For the
commodity group manufacturings he has computed the tariff reductions for
these countries at 36 per cent, 39 per cent, 39 per cent and 36 per cent,







countries are not available as far as we have been able to ascertain.
Discretionary - and following contact with the .Norwegian Ministry of
Commerce and GATT - we have assumed that a) the other EFTA countries (ex-
cluding Finland) have followed the U.K. and Japan and b) Canada and Fin-
land have reduced the tariff rates by the same percentage as the U.S.
and the EEC countries.
For our method of computing the tariff incidence it makes no
difference as to which of the two tariff reduction schedules in the
agreement based on the Kennedy Round the various countries followed.
The tariff adjustments under the auspices of the EEC and EFTA
entailed a number of deviations from the general tariff adjustment sche-
dules, as discussed in the introduction. For practical reasons we have
been forced to disregard these exceptions.
The tariff rates, classified by exporting and importing countries,
which were estimated for 1960 are to be found in table A.6.
N Importing






12.7 15.9 10.1 10.1 6.7
15.9 10.1 10.1 6.7
12.7 10.1 10.1 6.7
12.7 15.9 - 0 5.7
12.7 15.9 0 - 5.7
12.7 15.9 8.6 8.6
12.7 15.9 8.6 8.6 5.7
12.7 15.9 8.6 8.6 5.7
12.7 15.9 10.1 10.1 6.7
12.7 15.9 10.1 10.1 6.7
12.7 15.9 10.1 10.1 6.7
12.7 15.9 10.1 10.1 6.7
12.7 15.9 10.1 10.1 6.7
12.7 15.9 10.1 10.1 6.7
12.7 15.9 10.1 10.1 6.7
Canada






























Table A.6. 	 Estimated average tariff rates in 1960 on manufactured goods classified by exporting and importing countries. 1)
Italy U K way den mark land trea land
15.4 15.2 4.3 6.9 5.7 6.9 18.4 4,6
15.4 15.2 4.3 6.9 5.7 6.9 18.4 4.6
15.4 15.2 4.3 6.9 5.7 6.9 18.4 4.6
13.1 15.2 4.3 6.9 5.7 6.9 18.4 4.6
13.1 15.2 4.3 6.9 5.7 6.9 18.4 4.6
13.1 15.2 4.3 6.9 5.7 6.9 18.4 4.6
13.1 15.2 4.3 6.9 5.7 6.9 18.4 4.6
- 15.2 4.3 6.9 5.7 6.9 18.4 4.6
15.4 - 3.9 6.2 5.1 6.9 16.6 4.1
15.4 13.7 6.2 5.1 6.9 16.6 4.1
15.4 13.7 3.9 - 5.1 6.9 16.6 4.1
15.4 13.7 3.9 6.2 - 6.9 16.6 4.1
15.4 13.7 3.9 6.2 5.1 - 16.6 4.1
15.4 13.7 3.9 6.2 5.1 6.9 4.1
15.4 13.7 3.9 6.2 5.1 6.9 16.6 -
1) An element in this matrix is tk 2 , where tkt = t kt - 1. (See equation 2.4 where t kt is introduced.)
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APPENDIX B
Table X3.1. The weights d kj used for constructing price indices of competing exports for each country (k).
pk 	 = 	 E d k .PE, where d k . = E wk^s.^. (The diagonal elements are equal to d kk = ^ wkQ (Sk Q- I))
1)


































Canada U S A
Countr 	 k
Canada 	 -0.7113 0.0228
United States 	 0.0100 -0.5477
Japan 	 0.2282 0.0803
Belgium, Luxembourg 	 0.0341 0.1111
Netherlands 	 0.0259 0.1266
West Germany 	 0.0497 0.1122
France 	 0.0372 0.1247
Italy 	 0.0580 0.1149
United Kingdom 	 0.0727 0.1402
Norway   0.0304 0.1273
Sweden 	 0.0441 0.1207
Denmark 	 0.0373 0.1184
Finland 	 0.0435 0.1352
Austria 	 0.0310 0.1351





Canada 	 0.0770 0.0035
United States 	 0.0653 0.0064
Japan   0.0782 0.0042
Belgium, Luxembourg 	 0.0711 0.0071
Netherlands 	 0.0708 0.0092
West Germany 	 0.0827 0.0087
France 	 0.0731 0.0080
Italy 	 0.0703 0.0074
United Kingdom 	 -0.9082 0.0107
Norway 	 0.0987 -0.9688
Sweden 	 0.0936 0.0148
Denmark 	 0.1018 0.0216
Finland 	 0.0887 0.0259
Austria 	 0.0774 0.0130









0.0338 0.0182 0.1466 0.0426 	 0.0574
0.0484 0.0390 0.1456 0.0628 	 0.0500
0.0423 0.0263 0.1522 0.0551 	 0.0601
-0.8636 0.0606 0.2286 0.0964	 0.1044
0.0858 -0.9057 0.1994 0.1286 	 0.1008
0.0768 0.0474 -0.6848 0.0809 	 0.0654
0.0834 0.0787 0.2084 -0.8586 	 0.0833
0.1046 0.0714 0.1949 0.0965 -0.8913
0.0665 0.0469 0.2304 0.0791 	 0.0657
0.0613 0.0561 0.2227 0.0793	 0.0634
0.0631 0.0523 0.2203 0.0773 	 0.0649
0.0626 0.0527 0.2231 0.0766 	 0.0642
0.0663 0.0562 0.2080 0.0801 	 0.0683
0.0849 0.0672 0.1926 0.1169 	 0.0919




0.0066 0.0059 0.0065 0.0227
0.0092 0.0080 0.0125 0.0259
0.0077 0.0062 0.0092 0.0229
0.0112 0.0090 0.0181 0.0344
0.0133 0.0108 0.0202 0.0367
0.0134 0.0095 0.0138 0.0316
0.0118 0.0094 0.0216 0.0337
0.0115 0.0093 0.0196 0.0349
0.0170 0.0113 0.0154 0.0288
0.0333 0.0303 0.0239 0.0391
0.0227 0.0140 0.0201 0.0353
-0.9563 0.0269 0.0227 0.0377
0.0354 -0.9707 0.0231 0.0389
0.0190 0.0148 -0.9712 0.0329
0.0158 0.0124 0.0165 -0.9574
1) The symbols are defined in section 2 and section 3. This table is derived from a trade matrix for the 15 countries
in 1970. (Source: Statistics of Foreign Trade 1970, Series C, OECD.
46
REFERENCES:
Adams, F. G., H. Eguch i , and F . Meyer-zu-Schlochtern (1969) : An econometric 
analysis of international trade, OECD, Paris.
Armington, P. S. (1969) : 	 A theory of demand for products distinguished by
place of production, IMF Staff Papers 16, 159-176.
Deppler, M. C., and D. M. Ripley (1978): 	 The world trade model: Merchandise
trade, IMF Staff Papers 25, 147-206.
Frenger, P., E. S. Jansen, and M. Reymert (1979): 	 Modell for norsk eksport 	 av
bearbeidde industrivarer, ( A Model for Norwegian E:port of Manu-
factured Goods) . 	 Rapporter fra Statistisk Sentralbyrå 79/29, Oslo.
GATT (1974): 	 Basic documentation for the tariff study. Summary by indu-
strial product categories. March 1974, Geneve.
Joint Economic Committee (1961) : Trade restraints in the western community,
Subcommittee on foreign economic policy of the Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, Washington D.C.
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1967 - 1977) : Rapport om de europeiske
fellesskap i året 19.., diverse rapporter (I-XI) fra Markedsutvalget `
(for hvert år i perioden fra 1966 til 1976). (Reports on the european
communities in the year 19 .. , several reports from the Market Committee
for the period 1966 to 1976) .
Preeg, E. H. (1970): Trades and diplomats, The Brookings Institutions,
Washington D.C.
Robinson, W., T. R. Webb, and M. A. Townsend (1979) : 	 The influence of ex-
change rate changes on prices: A study of 18 industrial countries,
Economica 46, 27-50.
Samuelson, L. (1973): 	 A new model of world trade, OECD Economic Outlook: 
Occasional studies (December 1973), Paris.
Sodersten, B. (1970): International economics , Macmillan Press Ltd,
Basington, London.
Stortingsproposisjon 21 (1967 - 1968) : Om samtykke til avgivelse av erklæring
om godkjenning av resultatet av handelsforhandlingene i Geneve
1964-67 under Generalavtalen om tolltariffer og handel (GATT) . (On
the concent to the delivery of a declaration of approval of the result
of the trade negotiations in Geneve 1964-67 under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . )
Stortingsmelding 33 (1966 - 1967) : Om samarbeid i det Europeiske Frihandels-
forbund (EFTA) . (Cooperation in the Europen Free Trade Area).
United Nations (1961): 	 Standard International Trade Classification, Revised,
Statistical Papers Series M No 34, New York.
47
Issued in the series Reports from the Central Bureau of Statistics (REP) ISSN 0332-8422
Printed 1980
	No. 80/1	 Svein Longva, Lorents Lorentsen and Øystein Olsen: Energy in a Multi-Sectoral Growth Model
EiieF9 i i eii i i ensek Curs vekstmodell ISBN 6-53/-1U6e-6
- 80/2 	 Viggo Jean-Hansen: Totalregnskap for fiske- og fangstnæringen 1975 - 1978
ISBN 82-537-1080-1
- 80/3 	 Erik Biørn og Hans Erik Fosby: Kvartalsserier for brukerpriser på realkapital i norske
produksju^ -^ssektorer 	 ISBN 82-537-1087-9
- 80/4 	 Erik Biørn and Eilev S. Jansen: Consumer Demand in Norwegian Households 1973 - 1977 A
Data Base for Micro-Econometrics ISBN 82-537-1086-0
	80/5	 Ole K. Hovland: Skattemodellen LOTTE Testing av framskrivingsmetoder ISBN 82-537-1088-7
	80/6	 Fylkesvise elektrisitetsprognoser for 1985 og 1990 En metodestudie ISBN 82-537-1091-7
- 80/7 	 Analyse av utviklingen i elektrisitetsforbruket 1978 og første halvår 1979
ISBN 82-537-1129-8
- 80/8 	 Øyvind Lone: Hovedklassifiseringa i arealregnskapet ISBN 82-537-1104-2
	80/9	 Tor Bjerkedal : Yrke og fødsel En undersøkelse over betydningen av kvinners yrkesaktivitet
for opptreden av fosterskader 	 Occupation and Outcome of Pregnancy ISBN 82-537-1111-5
- 80/10 Statistikk fra det økonomiske og medisinske informasjonssystem Alminnelige somatiske syke-
hus 1978 	 ISBN 82-537-1119-0
80/12 Torgeir Mellen: Ressursregnskap for jern ISBN 82-537-1138-7
80/14 Petter Frenger: Import Share Functions in Input - Output Analysis 	 Importandelsfunksjoner
i kryssløpsmodeller ISBN 82-537-1143-3
80/15 Den statistiske behandlingen av oljevirksomheten 	 ISBN 82-537-1150-6
, 80/16 Adne Cappelen, Eva Ivås og Paal Sand: MODIS IV Detaljerte virkningstabeller for 1978
ISBN 82-537-1142-5
- 80/18 Susan Lingsom: Dagbøker med og uten faste tidsintervaller: En sammenlikning basert på
prøveundersøkelse om tidsnytting 1979 	 Open and Fixed Interval Time Diaries: A Comparison
Based on a Pilot Study on Time Use 1979 ISBN 82-537-1158-1
- 80/19 Sigurd Høst og Trygve Solheim: Radio- og fjernsynsundersøkelsen januar - februar 1980
ISBN 82-537-1155-7
- 80/21 Olav Bjerkholt og Øystein Olsen: Optimal kapasitet og fastkraftpotensial i et vannkraft-
system ISBN 82-537-1154-9
- 	 80/22 Eksakte metodar for analyse av to-vegstabellar 	 ISBN 82-537-1161-1
- 80/23 P. Frenger, E. S. Jansen and M. Reymert: Tariffs in a World Trade Model 	 An Analysis of
Changing Competitiveness due to Tariff Reductions in the 1960's and 1970's ISBN 82-537-1163-8
;;^>.^^ {: ^^;; M̂ :• 	 ;,:;,.




Publikasjonen utgis i kommisjon hos H. Aschehoug & Co. og
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, og er til salgs hos alle bokhandlere.
